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STRATEGIC TRENDS
Asia at a Crossroads
Paul Dibb
The areas of maximum danger and instability in the world today are in Asia,followed by the Middle East and parts of the former Soviet Union. The stra-
tegic situation in Asia is more uncertain and potentially threatening than any-
where in Europe. Unlike in Europe, it is possible to envisage war in Asia
involving the major powers: remnants of Cold War ideological confrontation
still exist across the Taiwan Straits and on the Korean Peninsula; India and Paki-
stan have nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and these two countries are more
confrontational than at any time since the early 1970s; in Southeast Asia, Indone-
sia—which is the world’s fourth-largest country—faces a highly uncertain future
that could lead to its breakup. The Asia-Pacific region spends more on defense
(about $150 billion a year) than any other part of the world except the United States
and Nato Europe. China and Japan are amongst the top four or five global military
spenders. Asia also has more nuclear powers than any other region of the world.
Asia’s security is at a crossroads: the region could go in
the direction of peace and cooperation, or it could slide
into confrontation and military conflict. There are posi-
tive tendencies, including the resurgence of economic
growth and the spread of democracy, which would en-
courage an optimistic view. But there are a number of
negative tendencies that must be of serious concern.
There are deep-seated historical, territorial, ideological,
and religious differences in Asia. Also, the region has no
history of successful multilateral security cooperation or
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arms control. Such multilateral institutions as the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations and the ASEAN Regional Forum have shown themselves to be in-
effective when confronted with major crises.
In judging the strategic future of Asia, we should learn from previous failures
of assessment and refrain from overconfident, straight-line extrapolations. Af-
ter the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, there was great fear that communism
would spread quickly to the rest of Southeast Asia and that the dominoes would
fall. That did not occur. In the 1980s, we were told that the coming Japanese eco-
nomic superpower would soon outstrip the United States; instead, Japan has re-
corded barely one-third of the economic growth of the United States since 1990.
Less than five years ago, it was being forecast that the so-called “Asian economic
miracle” would inevitably give the region a larger economy than the United
States and Europe; that view was destroyed by the Asian economic crisis. There
have also been predictions that China will be the new economic giant and that its
gross national product will be bigger than that of the United States by 2010. But by
most measures, China’s economy is only a fraction of that of the United States.1
This article assesses the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region over
the next five years, which is the period of most relevance to policy. It analyses the
geopolitics of the region, the strategic outlook and balance of power, and the risk
of military conflict in such places as the Taiwan Straits, the Korean Peninsula,
and the Indian subcontinent. It also examines the prospects for Indonesia’s se-
curity and what that might mean for Southeast Asia as a whole. The article con-
cludes by analysing, from the viewpoint of a prudent defense planner, America’s
policies toward the region and by assessing whether they need improvement.
THE GEOPOLITICS AND MILITARY GEOGRAPHY OF ASIA
There is a fashionable view that geography and geopolitics are no longer rele-
vant in the post–Cold War era. That is demonstrably untrue in Asia, where there
is a fierce sense of national sovereignty, enormous variations in culture and
civilisation, and a struggle for power and influence among the region’s great
powers. There are more than two dozen outstanding territorial conflicts in this
part of the world; some of them—such as those between China and Taiwan, be-
tween the two Koreas, and between India and Pakistan—are potentially very
dangerous. Whilst it is the case that globalisation and the information revo-
lution are having an increasing impact on Asia, the assertion of old-fashioned
nationalism and state sovereignty undermines the argument of those who assert
that the importance of the state is declining.
The strategic environment of Asia is characterized by the presence of three
great continental powers: China, India, and Russia. An arc of maritime powers,
many of which are allies or friends of the United States, flanks them. Except for
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Japan, most of these countries are middle-sized or small powers: South Korea,
Taiwan, the ten ASEAN countries, Australia and New Zealand, and the small is-
land nations of the South Pacific. Almost half of the world’s maritime trade
passes through the confined straits and archipelagic waters of Southeast Asia
and the South China Sea. The United States has traditionally been the dominant
naval power in this part of the world. Neither China nor India will have a true
blue-water navy over the next five years—although they will both seek to extend
their naval influence, and therefore their strategic ambitions will overlap in
Southeast Asia. This is an area of great strategic significance for the United States
and its allies—especially Japan, which transports nearly all of its oil imports
through the area’s chokepoints. China too is becoming more dependent upon
sea lines of communication as its trade increases, and China will need to import
more oil and gas to meet its energy requirements.
The political makeup of Asia is highly varied, and this adds to the geopolitical
complexity of the region. Unlike Europe, where a broad swathe of democracies
now occupies most of the continent, Asia has four of the world’s five remaining
communist countries: China, North Korea, Vietnam, and
Laos. Whilst there has been an encouraging rise of democ-
racy in recent years in South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and
the Philippines, authoritarian regimes are firmly in power
in Pakistan and Burma, and the governments in Malaysia
and Singapore practice forms of “soft authoritarianism.”
As for Indonesia, it remains to be seen whether democracy
will survive there. In any case, the trend toward democracy
in the region, if it continues, does not necessarily imply
easier relationships with the United States, as the New
Zealand case demonstrates. The highly questionable
proposition—which has become an article of faith in
some quarters in Washington—that democracies do not go to war with democ-
racies may be disproved one of these days in Asia. In any case, deep-seated histori-
cal, cultural, religious, and territorial differences in Asia suggest that, irrespective of
the development of democratic institutions, the dangers of armed conflict remain.
Late in 1999 there was a risk that military conflict would erupt (over East Timor)
between Australia and a newly democratic Indonesia.
As the “revolution in military affairs” spreads to Asia and introduces longer-
range and more accurate weapons supported by good surveillance information,
the geography of Asia will be compressed. The introduction of long-range cruise
missiles and the development of ballistic missiles will make smaller countries
much more vulnerable if deterrence fails. The risk then will be either of an
escalating proliferation of ballistic missiles, or of the acquisition from the United
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States of a protective ballistic missile defense, which in turn may lead to the multi-
plication of offensive missile systems. The ballistic missile proliferation challenge for
the United States and its allies will be more acute in Asia than anywhere else.
The ready availability of advanced conventional weapons not only com-
presses but alters the geography of the region. For instance, the proliferation of
supersonic antiship cruise missiles will make it more dangerous for the United
States and its allies to operate militarily in the littoral environment of many
states of the region. Thus although the long lead-times in acquiring major mili-
tary platforms are likely to keep the overall orders of battle of regional countries
from changing much over the next five years, capabilities in many instances can
change quickly through the acquisition of quite limited numbers of relatively
cheap, long-range, and accurate tactical missiles.
The structures and doctrines of many of the region’s armed forces are also
changing. In particular, there is less emphasis on land forces and greater atten-
tion to developing small but capable navies and air forces. There is also a trend
toward the development of amphibious troops for the protection of offshore
territories and assets. Fielding modern air forces and navies is becoming increas-
ingly expensive; the cost of acquiring and operating military platforms approxi-
mately doubles with each new generation. But newer platforms are in many
instances able to deliver more lethality and firepower. The ready availability of
satellite photography with a resolution of one meter or less, together with accu-
rate Global Positioning System information, will mean that even small powers
can have credible deterrent forces.
Nonetheless, the gap between the military technology of the United States
and that of potential peer competitors will, if anything, widen over the next five
years. The central question for America’s Asia-Pacific allies will be whether they
will be able to keep up with U.S. military forces in terms of basic interoperability
of communications and weapons systems.
THE BALANCE OF POWER IN ASIA
The Asia-Pacific region has entered a particularly complex strategic situation; a
new balance of power may be evolving. The Asian economic crisis, tension be-
tween China and the United States over Taiwan, North Korea’s nuclear and bal-
listic missile programs, the risk of war between India and Pakistan, and the
possibility of Indonesian disintegration have all arisen suddenly, and they serve
to underline the basic insecurity of the region. But whether Asia remains a
peaceful region will largely depend upon the struggle for power and influence
between the major powers: China, Japan, India, Russia, and the United States. It
is not in the interests of the United States or of its allies to see the region domi-
nated by any one Asian power or by a concert of them.
D I B B 2 5
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China is a rising power that sees itself as the natural leader in Asia. It perceives
its aspirations in this regard as being thwarted by the American military pres-
ence in the region and the U.S. alliance network. China is acquiring, with assis-
tance from Russia, modern military equipment that will enable it to prevail
militarily in the South China Sea against any regional power, if it so wishes. Were
China to succeed in asserting sovereignty over the South China Sea, it would be
able to penetrate deeply into Southeast Asia and influence events there. Thus
there are serious questions surrounding the rise of China to power. Will China
be a responsible and cooperative member of the international community, abid-
ing by the community’s rules of nonaggression? Or will China become an ex-
pansionist power, as have other rising powers in the past?
World history has been marked by the rise of ambitious new powers seeking
to displace weaker powers. China is many decades away from being a peer com-
petitor of the dominant world power, the United States; already, however, the
main danger to the region is the risk that the next military confrontation will
be between the United States and China. David Shambaugh stated in early 2000
that growing “strategic competition”
is likely to characterize Sino-Ameri-
can relations for most of the coming
decade, whatever American adminis-
tration came to office in 2001.2 The
greatest danger is over Taiwan: war
between the United States and China in the Taiwan Straits might well draw in
America’s allies, including Australia. Washington would expect its other allies,
particularly Japan and South Korea, to support it, and such expectations could
seriously damage its alliances in the region.
Short of such cataclysmic events, the main danger is that pressure might in-
crease for individual nations to side with either China or the United States in
their respective struggles for influence, thereby dividing the region. Some
countries, such as the Philippines and Vietnam, would probably climb on the
U.S. bandwagon. Others, such as Malaysia and Thailand, might incline toward
China. Indonesia has traditionally been hostile to China, but President
Abdurrahman Wahid has talked recently about a triangular relationship with
China and India that would offset Indonesia’s former close relationship with the
United States. The future course of Indonesia’s relations with China will be fol-
lowed with the utmost scrutiny, not least by Australia. The purchase by Indone-
sia of arms from China, for instance, would raise alarm.
There is the further issue that China does not accept the rationale for the U.S.
forward military presence in Asia. It explicitly calls for the abrogation of all
alliances, arguing that they are not conducive to peace and security in the
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post–Cold War world; Chinese officials have openly called for the removal of
U.S. forces from the region. Before his visit to Australia last year, President Jiang
Zemin proclaimed that alliances were “obsolete.” However, China must accept
that the United States is not going to withdraw from Asia and that America’s alli-
ances are not going to disappear. China needs to understand that Asia without
the United States would be an especially dangerous place, vulnerable to conflict
between China and Japan.
As China’s influence in Asia grows, India—which wants to be accepted as a
major power—will seek to compete with China. Until recently, India’s poor eco-
nomic performance, its preoccupation with Pakistan, and earlier its alliance
with the former Soviet Union served to limit its interest elsewhere in Asia. But
the Indian economy now seems set on a path of reform and is growing strongly.
The military balance on the subcon-
tinent now firmly favors India, and
with each year that passes its superior
economic performance will improve
its military advantage. India, there-
fore, will be able to lift its strategic
horizons. Southeast Asia is a natural
area for its future focus; India has
long-established ties to that region and has territories, including the Andaman
and Nicobar Islands, in close proximity. Already India is seeking to strengthen its
old relationship with Vietnam, as well as with Japan. The United States could be-
come a useful partner for India in its upcoming competition with China.
Japan is by far the most important power economically in Asia; its economy
accounts for 60 percent of Asia’s gross national products. Nonetheless,
China—whose economy is less than a fifth the size of that of Japan—has a
higher political profile in the region. Japan spends more on defense than any
other Asian country, and it has the most modern navy (both surface combatants
and submarines) and air force in the Asia-Pacific. Japan, however, continues to
be unwilling to use its military forces except in the most modest of United Na-
tions peacekeeping operations. Japan’s resulting inability to provide leadership
in Asia commensurate with its economic power is a worry. Partly, this has to do
with lingering memories of Japan’s aggression in the Second World War. It also
stems from Japan’s preoccupation with its domestic problems; its economy has
been virtually stagnant for a decade. Moreover, as was demonstrated during the
Asian economic crisis three years ago, the United States is not willing to allow
Japan to become the financial leader in the region. Still, it is important that
Japan take on more of a leadership role in order to offset the growth in China’s
influence. When it does, Japan will face a challenging strategic environment,
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marked by the rise of China’s power and by the prospect of a unified Ko-
rea—over seventy million people who see Japan as a traditional enemy.
The most crucial strategic relationship in the region will continue to be the
alliance between the United States and Japan. This relationship has recently been
reaffirmed and reinterpreted to provide for greater logistical support to U.S.
forces operating in the area. It remains to be seen, however, whether in fact Japan
would support American military operations on the Korean Peninsula or across
the Taiwan Straits. For the rest of the region, including China, the United
States–Japan alliance provides an essential assurance that Japan will not danger-
ously rearm. Japan could double its conventional military forces within five
years, or produce nuclear weapons. Neither will occur as long as Japan continues
to have confidence in the United States and in its military presence in Northeast
Asia. Even so, there are already signs that for the first time in over fifty years
Japan is beginning to develop its own strategic concepts and dedicated
force-structure elements, such as military satellites and a defense intelligence or-
ganization. The Japanese are also beginning to worry about the durability of the
U.S. commitment in Northeast Asia and about America’s tendency to go over
Japan’s head in dealing with China. What must be prevented at all costs is an ero-
sion of Japan’s confidence in the United States and a consequent military con-
frontation (or strategic accommodation) between Japan and China.
Russia, which is the other major power, is unlikely to be a significant player in
Asia for the foreseeable future, even though it possesses important military as-
sets in Northeast Asia. It will remain preoccupied with its internal political and
economic affairs and the situation along its borders, especially in Siberia and the
former Soviet Central Asian republics. Russia’s ability to supply advanced con-
ventional weapons to China and India is, however, a matter of concern. Arms ex-
ports are one of the few competitive products of the ailing Russian economy.
Russia has the capacity to upset the regional military balance, and it is already
doing this through its arms shipments to China.
POTENTIAL FLASHPOINTS AND TROUBLESPOTS
The most dangerous part of Asia at present is, as we have noted, the Taiwan
Straits. There seems to be in the domestic politics of Taiwan an inevitable dy-
namic that leads the island to assert its international status as an independent
state and to challenge the “one China policy.” The situation is exacerbated by
growing tensions between the United States and China over this issue, as well as
by unease in Washington over China’s nuclear weapons program, and in Beijing
over the U.S. desire to deploy national and theater ballistic missile defenses. Dis-
pute over these issues brings with it real risks of miscalculation. China lacks the
conventional military capability to mount an amphibious invasion of Taiwan,
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and this will remain the case for at least the next five years.3 But there are other
options open to China, including a naval blockade and the use of ballistic mis-
siles. War across the Taiwan Straits would inevitably bring in the United States,
and then (as already mentioned) involve enormously difficult choices for U.S.
allies in the Asia-Pacific region—hence the strong desire by those allies to see the
current tensions between China and the United States over Taiwan resolved by
peaceful means.
The situation on the Korean Peninsula remains fraught with danger, as it
has been for almost fifty years. The possibility of a North Korean attack is
ever-present, despite the recent lessening of tensions. Even so, the outbreak of
war is unlikely. Unlike in the early 1950s, North Korea could not now count on
military support from China and Russia; it would face the bleak prospect of total
defeat by the United States and South Korea. Still, miscalculation by the North
Korean regime cannot be discounted, nor can a sudden collapse of the North,
which would present the South
with the horrendous costs of creat-
ing a unified nation.4 The most
likely scenario for the next five
years is a continuation of a man-
ageable degree of tension. Developments in relations between the two states
since June 2000 suggest that there may now be some prospect of direct peace ne-
gotiations between them. Should war break out, however, the United States
would naturally expect its allies quickly to provide tangible and useful military
contributions. If Japan were to refuse to do so, it would put at risk its relation-
ship with the United States.
India and Pakistan have been in confrontation with each other since their cre-
ation as separate states in 1947. The possession of nuclear weapons by both these
countries and their development of ballistic missiles have produced a dangerous
situation. Their religious and territorial differences, as well as the fact that the
military balance between them is moving in favor of India, may result in a highly
volatile scenario in which the use of nuclear weapons is a real possibility. There is
a serious lack of early-warning technologies and of nuclear weapon command
and control arrangements in both countries. If the world ever experiences ex-
changes of nuclear weapons, the first may well be between India and Pakistan.
In Southeast Asia, the most crucial question is the future of Indonesia. Indo-
nesia is in the middle of a dangerous political transition; the central issue is
whether Indonesia will remain a cohesive nation-state or disintegrate. There is a
better than even chance that Indonesia will muddle through and retain its
basic territorial integrity, although the provinces of Aceh and Irian Jaya (West
Papua) are high-risk regions. Were Indonesia to disintegrate, the implications
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for neighboring countries—especially Singapore and Malaysia, as well as Papua
New Guinea and Australia—would be serious. These nations would be faced
with an unstable and violent neighbor. Relations between Indonesia and
Australia have already become strained over the East Timor issue; friction be-
tween the two is now higher than it has been for many decades. There are those
at senior levels in the Indonesian armed forces (the TNI) and foreign ministry
who believe that Australia’s next step will be to destabilize West Papua.5
The most optimistic scenario leads over the next two to three years to a stable,
democratically elected central government in Jakarta. But transition from an au-
thoritarian military regime to democracy is always dangerous. The Indonesian
defense minister, Juwono Sudarsono, has said that the shift will be gradual, that
it could take ten to fifteen years.6 There is no doubt that the creation of a
rules-based civil society will take a very considerable amount of time. Those in
the United States who want to push Indonesia quickly in this direction need to
learn more patience.
The reaction from the TNI to any attempt at creating independent states in
Aceh or Irian Jaya would be intense and might well put an end to democracy in
Indonesia. The focus of the external powers, as well as of such major interna-
tional institutions as the International Monetary Fund, must be on helping
Indonesia to recover economically and build a democratic society. This will be
no easy task. As a 1998 World Bank report commented, “Indonesia is in a deep
crisis. No country in recent history, let alone one the size of Indonesia, has ever
suffered such a dramatic reversal of fortune.”7 The Indonesian economy remains
very vulnerable to another economic crisis, just when the political situation in
Jakarta has become so volatile. A combination of religious fervor and strident
nationalism in a failed Indonesian democracy would be of great concern to In-
donesia’s neighbors, especially if aggressive foreign policies were the outcome. A
more extreme Islamic stance in Indonesia, when similar sentiments are emerg-
ing in Malaysia and the southern Philippines, would be deeply disturbing. A
unified, secular, and democratic Indonesia is in the region’s interest.
Another dangerous part of Southeast Asia is the South China Sea, where there
are overlapping territorial claims between China (which claims all the islands
and reefs), Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, and Indonesia.
The United States is not a principal party to these territorial disputes, but it must
make it clear to China that it will not tolerate Chinese territorial hegemony over
the South China Sea. Regular demonstrations of the naval capabilities of the
United States and its allies would be useful reminders to China that its proper
course of action is negotiation with the countries of Southeast Asia.
The South Pacific has traditionally been the most stable part of the Asia-
Pacific region, but it now comprises a number of failed states. Papua New
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Guinea, which shares a common border with Indonesia, has a fragile economy,
high levels of corruption and violence, and an active secessionist movement on
Bougainville. If Bougainville secedes, New Britain, New Ireland, and regions ad-
joining Indonesian Irian Jaya may also separate. The peoples of Papua New
Guinea and Irian Jaya share a Melanesian origin and a dislike of Indonesia. In
the event of conflict between Indonesia and its Irian Jaya province, the Papua
New Guineans—who have a security treaty with Australia—would side with
their Melanesian brothers.
Several of the other South Pacific islands are scarcely viable economically and
have regimes noted for corruption. In the Solomon Islands there is an active in-
surrection between the peoples of Guadalcanal and Malaita, which has led to the
overthrow of the elected government. Fiji has experienced its third coup since
1987, and ethnic tension between the indigenous Fijians and the Indian commu-
nity has resulted in widespread violence and disenfranchisement of the Indians;
George Speight’s coup was no more than the act of an armed thug. Harsh diplo-
matic and economic sanctions have been applied by Australia and New Zealand.
New Zealand, which is Australia’s oldest ally, is no longer a member of the
ANZUS alliance and has so reduced its defense capabilities that it is capable of
little more than peacekeeping operations. As a result, Australia, which confronts
an arc of instability stretching from Indonesia and Papua New Guinea to the Sol-
omon Islands and Fiji, will increasingly see New Zealand as more of a liability
than a useful defense partner.
UNCERTAIN U.S. POLICIES
American political power and military presence is the key to maintaining a
peaceful balance of power in Asia over the next five years.8 Only the United
States has the power, credibility, and distance (both geographical and cultural)
from the region to maintain the regional balance. Other contenders for this role
would not be acceptable locally: China is feared as a potentially dominant—and
perhaps expansionist—power; great suspicion still surrounds any ambitions for
regional leadership that Japan might have; India is seen as essentially peripheral
to East Asian affairs; and Russia is a weak and distracted power.
U.S. credibility is based not only on its military presence but also on its long
historical ties to the region, extending back a hundred years. Most countries in
the region, apart from China, agree that the departure of the United States
would leave the region open to fierce contention between China and Japan or
India, possibly leading to war. But the United States is distracted these days by
domestic events and Europe. It is also much more severely stretched than in ear-
lier decades; it must react to crises across the globe with a military little more
than half the size it was in the Cold War.
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For that reason, there must now be some doubt whether the United States can
fulfil its much-vaunted East Asian strategy, based on a capacity to handle two re-
gional conflicts “almost simultaneously.”9 Inability by the United States to cope
with a major crisis in, for example, the Korean Peninsula at the same time as it
was fighting a regional adversary elsewhere, perhaps in the Middle East, would
be disastrous for its alliance system. The United States is the only nation with the
power to enforce security across the region. No reasonable ally, however, can ex-
pect Washington to be a perfect arbiter and enforcer of security, and indeed,
there is a growing perception that the United States tends to carry out its mili-
tary duties only after armed conflict has broken out.
This uncertainty over the speed of a U.S. response has consequences for
countries in Asia that expect the United States to maintain regional peace and
security. Many in Asia believe that the United States will not necessarily be on
the spot (except in Korea) at the moment when conflict breaks out. It may—de-
pending on the degree of strategic interest and the nature of domestic reac-
tion—turn up quickly, and it might ultimately restore the status quo ante, but
this will be of little comfort for nations whose territory has been threatened in
the meantime. Moreover, the manner in which the United States intervenes will
be strongly shaped by domestic considerations: it will seek to respond to an
armed conflict in the most domestically acceptable way—in other words, with
airpower. But in some of the more likely regional scenarios, ground forces would
be essential.
Strategic inconsistency was evident in the U.S. response to the Asian eco-
nomic crisis. Asia’s multilateral institutions—APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation), ASEAN, and the ASEAN Regional Forum—failed to play any
role in addressing the crisis, underscoring how heavily regional economic and
strategic stability relies on the policies and initiatives of the United States. This
means that Asia’s welfare depends critically on the depth of strategic under-
standing in Washington. But it appears that U.S. policy makers still weigh strate-
gic significance in Cold War terms: South Korea received quick and substantial
economic assistance, because it faced a communist North armed with nuclear
weapons; Indonesia did not, because, the Cold War being over, the world’s
fourth-largest country is no longer important to the United States as a bastion
against communism in Southeast Asia. Instead, Washington let the IMF im-
pose dangerously destabilizing measures on Jakarta. Apparently, human rights
rather than geopolitics dominate the United States–Indonesia relationship to-
day. While human rights have an undeniably important place in international
diplomacy, they should not dominate relations with an Indonesia struggling to
maintain its social and political cohesion. For the sake of the stability of the
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whole of Southeast Asia, the United States needs to focus more on the critical
importance of Indonesian unity and cohesion.
The United States does not appear to have developed a new standard by
which to measure the strategic significance of countries such as Indonesia. A
decade after the end of the Cold War, it is time for Washington to develop a more
refined process for deciding the policy response to crises in Asia—some of
which will determine the future of the region. Washington should cease allocat-
ing economic and political support on the basis of Cold War strategic values and
devise new tenets for its strategic engagement policy in Asia.
There is also growing unease in the region about America’s longer-term
commitment to keeping about a hundred thousand troops deployed in North-
east Asia, which has been the position of U.S. administrations for the last decade.
Adding to the sense of uncertainty is open discussion in the United States
about how emerging military technologies, particularly in long-range precision
strike, could lessen the need for forward operating bases. The total number of
U.S. troops in South Korea and Japan and at sea with the Seventh Fleet is in any
case now much closer to ninety thousand; the figure of a hundred thousand is
becoming increasingly less credible. Thought also needs to be given to the im-
pact on the American presence of
a future unified Korea, both in
Korea itself and in Japan. This is
not to argue that there are no
imaginable political circum-
stances in which there could be a phased reduction of American forces in North-
east Asia. But the implications for confidence within the region of a sudden and
large-scale reduction suggest that any drawdown would need to be planned in
advance, in consultation with allies.
There is no unifying enemy like the Soviet Union to keep the United States
and its European allies together, yet the Nato alliance has adjusted, by rejuvenat-
ing its charter and expanding its membership. Will the United States and its al-
lies in the Asia-Pacific region similarly devise a new common security concept?
Or will there be a gradual weakening of the bilateral alliances with Australia, Ja-
pan, and South Korea? The alliance in the Asia-Pacific should no longer be
threat based but rather should emphasize shared interests in the maintenance of
regional stability.10
There seems to be growing interest in the United States in multilateral secu-
rity. Admiral Dennis C. Blair, the commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Com-
mand, has promoted the concept of “security communities.” The idea here is to
encourage “collective efforts into resolving regional points of friction; contrib-
ute armed forces and other aid to peacekeeping and humanitarian operations to
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support diplomatic solutions; and plan, train, and exercise . . . armed forces to-
gether for these operations.”11 According to Admiral Blair, these security com-
munities may be alliance-treaty signatories, participants in nonmilitary
organizations like the ASEAN Regional Forum, or simply groups of nations
joined by geographic considerations or common concerns. The communities
would be committed to policy coordination—including combined military co-
operation on specific regional security issues—to advance peaceful develop-
ment over time without major conflict.12 The problem with this idea is that it
risks diluting the primacy of strong bilateral security alliances in the region, and
that it may be seen as being aimed, eventually, at the creation of a multilateral se-
curity enterprise in Asia.
Asia has not had a good track record with multilateralism. The Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization, which was created in 1954 and dissolved in 1977, was not
an effective organization. Unlike Nato, it never had standing forces that could be
committed in the event of conflict. The ASEAN Regional Forum started off in
the early 1990s with much fanfare and with the aim of progressing steadily from
military confidence-building measures to preventive diplomacy and, eventually,
conflict resolution. But in the eight years of its existence it has not progressed
much beyond discussing basic confidence-building measures.13 Many of the
military forces in Asia are highly secretive, declining to publish even the most
basic information about their capabilities. They resist arms-control ideas and
transparency measures, even those of kinds common in Europe. It is difficult
therefore to be optimistic about the outlook for multilateral security coopera-
tion in Asia. American ideas in this regard need to be better thought through,
and they need to avoid any appearance of being aimed at containing China.
GUIDELINES FOR U.S. POLICY MAKERS
Strategic developments in Asia are not likely to pose fundamental challenges to
American military power and influence over the next five years, as long as the
United States retains a credible forward military presence and is not found
wanting in a major military crisis involving its allies. However, the United States
and its allies need to do more together, given the unpredictability of the strategic
situation in Asia and the speed with which adverse events could unfold.
There is no doubt about the fundamental economic strength of the United
States and its allies in the region, or of the military superiority of the U.S. alli-
ance system. The concern is the cohesion of America’s alliances in an era when
there is no common threat but doubts exist about the political will of leaders to
use force if confronted with military adventurism in Asia. Any perception of wa-
vering or ambiguity in the U.S. military commitment to the region could lead to
rapid destabilization. America’s allies need to do much more to provide for their
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own security, to develop military forces that can deal with crises in their imme-
diate neighborhoods and that can also make useful contributions to U.S. opera-
tions farther afield.
With these guidelines in mind, let us proceed to some specific policy recom-
mendations. First, United States security planners and their allied opposite
numbers need to prepare for less benign strategic futures in Asia, not relying on
comfortable predictions that the region will experience prolonged stability and
peace. These alternative futures obviously embrace such scenarios as war be-
tween the United States and China over the Taiwan Straits, and conflict on the
Korean Peninsula. But planners should also examine what the United States
should do in the event of nuclear war between India and Pakistan; of Chinese
use of military force in the South China Sea against a friendly ASEAN country;
and of the emergence in Indonesia of a strongly nationalist regime that antago-
nizes its neighbors.
There is a clear implication here for allied intelligence services: the size of the
task in the Asia-Pacific region suggests more (rather than less) in the way of in-
telligence cooperation. But the sheer outpouring of data from overhead col-
lection systems threatens to overwhelm our analytical capabilities. Allies need to
do more about training good minds who are expert on Asia and who are not
afraid of challenging conventional intelligence wisdoms.
From a defense planning perspective, it is important to understand that in the
Asia-Pacific region potential military operations will be essentially maritime in na-
ture. Apart from the Korean Peninsula, U.S. military forces are not likely to be in-
volved in large-scale ground-force operations. The dominant geopolitical change
in the new security environment has been the virtual elimination for military
planning purposes of allied continental
commitments; the emerging struggle for
power in Asia will focus on political fault
lines that are maritime rather than conti-
nental in aspect. The development of
China’s military power and the response to
it of India and Japan are likely to put pressure on the chain of America’s friends
and allies in the long littoral extending between South Korea and Taiwan in the
north to the ASEAN countries and Australia in the south.
The new technological challenge in this maritime environment is the growing
threat from high-speed, precise cruise missiles—both air and sea launched—
and long-range ballistic missiles that can threaten fixed forward operating
bases.14 These technological changes mean that the U.S. and allied forces op-
erating in the complex littoral and archipelagic waters of the region will be
more vulnerable than they have been; maritime battlefields in the
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Asia-Pacific will become more lethal. For America’s allies who want to oper-
ate in joint task forces, there will be force-structure implications in the cost
of platforms, like air-warfare-capable destroyers, that can operate in
high-threat environments.
While no peer competitor to the United States will emerge over the next five
years, the political challenge is that alliance relationships in the Asia-Pacific re-
gion will be less predictable, and less committed to allied war-fighting, than they
were in the Cold War. America’s key allies in the region (Japan, South Korea, and
Australia) would be most reluctant, for example, to commit forces in a U.S.-led
coalition war with China over Taiwan. Also, America’s aversion to casualties sug-
gests that the United States will be most unlikely to commit forces on the ground
in Southeast Asia—as was demonstrated in East Timor.
The United States will continue to hold the balance of power in Asia over
the next five years, but its policies will come under increasing scrutiny by its
friends and others. It is important in this context that American policy not
demonize China as the next “evil empire.” Neither Japan, South Korea, nor
Australia would be willing parties to such an ill considered approach. Of
course, America’s allies must make it clear to China which side they are on
and that they will not tolerate Chinese interference in alliance relationships.
However, the United States needs to develop much more thoughtful policies
toward China, including in such areas as ballistic missile defense.15
The commitment of the United States to forward basing in Northeast Asia
and to the maintenance of a nominal hundred thousand troops needs careful
handling over the next five years. The new administration will most likely re-
view the question of U.S. forces based overseas. At least until the Korean
question is settled, it would be unwise to announce any hasty withdrawals.
Care also needs to be taken following any U.S. withdrawal from South Korea
with any subsequent effects on the American military presence in Japan and
on inclinations in Tokyo to build up its own capabilities. While Japan should
be encouraged to improve its defense forces over the coming years in order to
become a more useful security partner of the United States, this should be
done gradually and with due regard for the sensitivities of other countries in
the region.16
Given the greatly reduced size of the U.S. Pacific Fleet since the end of the
Cold War, and the much broader range of potential contingencies in which it
could be involved, the United States should expect more of its allies. Japan and
Australia in particular could significantly supplement the Pacific Fleet’s sur-
face ships, submarines, and maritime patrol aircraft.17 While these platforms
will not generally be of the same combat capability as those of the United
States, they should be adequate for littoral operations in mid-intensity
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conflicts. Some, like the conventional submarines of Japan and Australia,
have operational advantages not possessed by those of the United States.
In general, the United States needs to develop more coherence and predict-
ability in its Asia-Pacific security strategy. This applies especially to its policies
toward China, as mentioned, but the United States also needs to give greater at-
tention to Southeast Asia and, especially, Indonesia. The central importance of
Southeast Asia to the maritime trade of the entire Asia-Pacific, the fact that the
ten ASEAN countries have a combined population of over 500 million, and the
key role of Indonesia all point to the need for Washington to give greater atten-
tion to this part of the world. For instance, Australia cannot be left essentially on
its own, with only episodic U.S. interest and involvement, to help Indonesia
emerge from its current acute political and economic difficulties.18 As we have
seen, the future of that country will profoundly affect peace and stability in
Southeast Asia. Its potential to interfere with freedom of passage in the Malacca,
Sunda, and Lombok Straits should be a matter of concern to defense planners in
the United States as well as Australia.
Finally, the United States needs to take great care in developing multilateral se-
curity ideas, such as “security communities.” While the intention may be to pre-
pare for peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations, there is a growing
unease that well tried bilateral alliances will be eroded in the process. There is al-
ready a view in the region that America’s key alliances are nowhere near as im-
portant to it as they were in the Cold War, that vital American national security
interests are no longer clearly defined, and that Washington involves itself un-
predictably in some overseas episodes and not in others. In these circumstances,
there is a risk that the alliance framework in the Asia-Pacific will begin to fray.
In light of the uncertain strategic future facing the region outlined in this ar-
ticle, the United States and its allies need to do more together to shape the re-
gional security environment to their advantage. With better coordination they
are well placed to do so—but they need to develop habits of franker strategic di-
alogue about contentious issues. The United States should listen more carefully
to its allies and friends who are in the region and who well understand the nu-
ances of strategic developments there.
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